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Abstract
We consider Young (1985)’s characterization of the Shapley value,
and give a new proof of this axiomatization. Moreover, as applications
of the new proof, we show that Young (1985)’s axiomatization of the
Shapley value works on various well-known subclasses of TU games.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider one of the well-known characterizations of the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953): Young (1985)’s axiomatization. The Shapley
value is probably the most popular one-point solution (value) of transferable
utility (TU) cooperative games (henceforth games). It is applied in various
fields ranging from medicine to statistics, from engineering to accounting etc.
Therefore a solid characterization could well serve, among others, applica-
tions by helping in understanding its very nature.
Young (1985) axiomatizes the Shapley value with three axioms: Efficiency
(Pareto optimality PO), Symmetry or Equal Treatment Property ETP (al-
though Symmetry and ETP are different axioms, they are equivalent for
TU games), and Strong Monotonicity. Moulin (1988) suggests an alterna-
tive proof for Young (1985)’s result in the three player setting. Both Young
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(1985) and Moulin (1988) consider the whole class of TU games, however,
Young (1985) also shows that this characterization is valid on other classes
of games, he specifies the class of superadditive games.
With respect to other subclasses on which Young (1985)’s axiomatization
works we have to mention three other papers. Neyman (1989) shows that a
solution defined on the additive group generated by a game is Efficient (PO),
Symmetric (or ETP ) and Strongly Monotonic if and only if it is the Shap-
ley value. Khmelnitskaya (2003) proves that Young (1985)’s axiomatization
works on the class of non-negative constant-sum games with non-zero worth
of grand coalition and on the (entire) class of constant-sum games. Fur-
thermore, Mlodak (2003) applies the same method as that Khmelnitskaya
(2003) does to characterize the Shapley value a´ la Young (1985) on the class
of non-negative bilateral games.
It is well-known that the validity of an axiomatization can vary from
subclass to subclass, e.g. Shapley (1953)’s axiomatization of the Shapley
value is valid on the class of monotone games but not valid on the class
of strictly monotone games. Therefore, we must consider each subclass of
games one by one.
The main motivation of this paper is methodological. We give a new proof
of Young (1985)’s axiomatization of the Shapley value; by this result there
are three different methods for checking the validity of Young (1985)’s ax-
iomatization of the Shapley value (on subclasses of games): Young (1985)’s,
Moulin (1988)’s and our. We emphasize these three methods are not compa-
rable, for each of them there are cases where the one works and the others
do not, vice versa, and naturally there cases where all work and where non
of them works.
The setup of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
terminology used throughout the paper. Section 3 discusses our main result.
2 Preliminaries
Notation: let |N | and 2N denote the cardinality of set N and the set of all
subsets of N respectively. Moreover, A ⊂ B means A ⊆ B, but A 6= B. and
we also use |a| for the absolute value of real number a. Finally,
∑
i∈∅ xi = 0,
that is, the empty sum is zero.
Let N 6= ∅, |N | < ∞ and v : 2N → R be a function such that v(∅) = 0.
Then N and v are called set of players and transferable utility cooperative
game (henceforth game) respectively. The class of games with player set N
is denoted by GN .
Let v ∈ GN , i ∈ N , and for each S ⊆ N : let v′i(S) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).
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Then v′i is called Player i’s marginal contribution function in game v. In
other words, v′i(S) is Player i’s marginal contribution to coalition S in game
v.
In this paper, along with GN , we consider also subclasses of games defined
below. A game v ∈ GN is
• essential, if v(N) >
∑
i∈N
v({i}),
• convex, if for each S, T ⊆ N : v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ),
• strictly convex, if for each S, T ⊆ N , S * T , T * S: v(S) + v(T )
< v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ),
• superadditive, if for each S, T ⊆ N , S ∩T = ∅: v(S)+ v(T ) ≤ v(S∪T ),
• strictly superadditive, if for each S, T ⊆ N , S, T 6= ∅, S ∩ T = ∅:
v(S) + v(T ) < v(S ∪ T ),
• weakly superadditive, if for each S ⊆ N , i ∈ N \ S: v(S) + v({i})
≤ v(S ∪ {i}),
• strictly weakly superadditive, if for each S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, i ∈ N \ S:
v(S) + v({i}) < v(S ∪ {i}),
• monotone, if for each S, T ⊆ N , S ⊆ T : v(S) ≤ v(T ),
• strictly monotone, if for each S, T ⊆ N , S ⊂ T : v(S) < v(T ),
• additive, if for each S, T ⊆ N , S ∩ T = ∅: v(S) + v(T ) = v(S ∪ T ),
• weakly subadditive, if for each S ⊆ N , i ∈ N \ S: v(S) + v({i}) ≥
v(S ∪ {i}),
• strictly weakly subadditive, if for each S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, i ∈ N \ S:
v(S) + v({i}) > v(S ∪ {i}),
• subadditive, if for each S, T ⊆ N , S ∩ T = ∅: v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ),
• strictly subadditive, if for each S, T ⊆ N , S, T 6= ∅, S ∩ T = ∅: v(S) +
v(T ) > v(S ∪ T ),
• concave, if for each S, T ⊆ N : v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ),
• strictly concave, if for each S, T ⊆ N , S * T , T * S: v(S) + v(T )
> v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
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For the definition of essential games see e.g. von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953), and for other types of games see e.g. Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003).
The following alternative definitions of (strictly) convex and (strictly)
concave games are well known:
Game v ∈ GN is (strictly) convex, if for each i ∈ N , T, Z ⊆ N \ {i}
such that Z ⊂ T : v′i(Z) ≤ v
′
i(T ) (v
′
i(Z) < v
′
i(T )),
and v ∈ GN is (strictly) concave, if for each i ∈ N , T, Z ⊆ N \ {i}
such that Z ⊂ T : v′i(Z) ≥ v
′
i(T ) (v
′
i(Z) > v
′
i(T )).
(1)
The dual of game v ∈ GN is the game v¯ ∈ GN such that for each S ⊆ N :
v¯(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S).
For any game v ∈ GN , players i, j ∈ N are equivalent (symmetric), i ∼v j,
if for each S ⊆ N such that i, j /∈ S: v′i(S) = v
′
j(S). It is easy to verify that
for any game v ∈ GN ∼v is a binary equivalence relation on N ×N .
Furthermore, if S ⊆ N is such that for all i, j ∈ S: i ∼v j, then we say
that S is an equivalence set in game v.
Next we summarize some important properties of dual games. For any
game v ∈ GN :
If i ∼v j, then i ∼v¯ j.
If w′i = v
′
i, then w¯
′
i = v¯
′
i.
The dual of a (strictly) convex game is a (strictly) concave game.
The dual of a (strictly) concave game is a (strictly) convex game.
(2)
Function ψ : A → RN , defined on set A ⊆ GN , is a solution on A.
Throughout the paper we consider single-valued solutions (values).
For any game v ∈ GN the Shapley solution φ is given by
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
v′i(S)
|S|!(|N \ S| − 1)!
|N |!
, i ∈ N,
where φi(v) is also called Player i’s Shapley value Shapley (1953).
The solution ψ on class of games A ⊆ GN satisfies
• Pareto optimality (PO), if for each v ∈ A:
∑
i∈N
ψi(v) = v(N),
• Equal Treatment Property (ETP ), if for all v ∈ A, i, j ∈ N : i ∼v j
implies ψi(v) = ψj(v),
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• Marginality (M), if for all v, w ∈ A, i ∈ N : v′i = w
′
i implies ψi(v) =
ψi(w).
Remark 2.1. Notice that the Shapley solution is (completely) determined by
the players’ marginal contribution functions. Therefore for any solution ψ
meeting axiom M : if ψi(v) = φi(v) and v
′
i = w
′
i, then ψi(w) = φi(w).
It is well known and not difficult to check that the Shapley solution meets
axioms PO, ETP and M .
3 The main result
In this section we present our main result. The following example illustrates
the idea behind our result (Theorem 3.4). This example shows that we can
construct chains of games such that in any chain the elements are connected
by axiom M and in the terminal games all players are equivalent.
Example 3.1. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and v = (0, 0, 0, 3, 1, 2, 3) ∈ GN , where
v = (v({1}), v({2}), v({3}), v({1, 2}), v({1, 3}), v({2, 3}), v(N)). Then v is
a superadditive but not convex game, and 1 ≁v 2, 1 ≁v 3, 2 ≁v 3.
Furthermore, let ψ be a PO, ETP and M solution on GN . We show that
ψ2(v) = φ2(v).
Take Player 1 as a singleton equivalence set in game v and choose Player
2. Then there is a game w = (0, 0, 0, 3, 2, 2, 4) such that w′2 = v
′
2 and 1 ∼
w 2
(it is clear that w is not the only game in which players 1 and 2 are equivalent
and w′2 = v
′
2).
Next take equivalence set {1, 2} in game w and choose Player 3. Then
there is a game z = (0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 3) such that z′3 = w
′
3 and 1 ∼
z 2 ∼z 3.
Then axioms PO and ETP imply that ψ(z) = φ(z). Moreover, by axiom
M , ψ3(w) = φ3(w). Since ψ is PO and ETP , 1 ∼
w 2, therefore ψ(w) = φ(w).
By applying axiom M again, we get ψ2(v) = φ2(v).
From Example 3.1 it is clear that we can deduce ψi = φi for any i (player).
In other words, we can show that ψ(v) = φ(v). All we need is that ψ must
be defined on the paths from v to z (different w and z for different i).
The next notion is an important ingredient of our main theorem.
Definition 3.2. Class A ⊆ GN is M-closed, if for each game v ∈ A, equiv-
alence set in v S ⊆ N , and Player k ∈ N \ S there exists w ∈ A such that
S ∪ {k} is an equivalence set in w and w′k = v
′
k.
Remark 3.3. Notice that from (2), if A ⊆ GN is an M-closed class of games,
then A¯ = {v¯ ∈ GN : v ∈ A} is also M-closed.
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The following theorem is our main result.
Theorem 3.4. Let class A ⊆ GN be M-closed. Then solution ψ defined on
class A, satisfies axioms PO, ETP and M , if and only if ψ = φ, that is, if
and only if, it is the Shapley solution.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. If : It is well-known.
Only if: Class A is M-closed, therefore there exists z(1) ∈ A such that
z(1)′i2 = z
′
i2
and {i1, i2} is an equivalence set in z(1). Let i3 ∈ N \ {i1, i2}.
Class A is M-closed therefore there exists z(2) ∈ A such that z(2)′i3 =
z(1)′i3 and {i1, i2, i3} is an equivalence set in z(2). Let i4 ∈ N \ {i1, i2, i3}.
...
Class A isM-closed therefore there exists z(n−1) ∈ A such that z(n−1)′in
= z(n− 2)′in and {i1, i2, . . . , in} (= N) is an equivalence set in z(n− 1).
By axioms PO and ETP , ψ(z(n−1)) = φ(z(n−1)), since all the players
i1, i2, . . . , in are symmetric in z(n− 1).
Since solution ψ meets axiom M , and by construction z(n−1)′in = z(n−
2)′in , it follows that (see Remark 2.1) ψin(z(n−2)) = φin(z(n−1)). Next, all
the players i1, i2, . . . , in−1 are symmetric in game z(n−2), whence by axioms
ETP and PO we get ψ(z(n− 2)) = φ(z(n− 2)).
By applying a similar reasoning as above, and since in−2 was arbitrarily
chosen, we get ψ(z(n− 3)) = φ(z(n− 3)).
...
Since i2 ∈ N \{i1} was arbitrarily chosen, ψ is defined on A, and satisfies
axioms PO and M , we get ψ(z) = φ(z).
Finally, i1 was arbitrarily chosen, therefore ψ(v) = φ(v). 
Next, we show that the above theorem implements Young’s Young (1985)
result.
Theorem 3.5 (Young (1985)). Solution ψ on GN satisfies axioms PO, ETP
and M , if and only if ψ = φ, that is, if and only if, it is the Shapley solution.
To prove Theorem 3.5 it is enough to show that GN is M-closed.
Proposition 3.6. The class fo games GN is M-closed.
First we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7. Let v ∈ GN . Then S ⊆ N is an equivalence set in game v,
if and only if for all T, Z ⊆ N such that T \ S = Z \ S and |T | = |Z|:
v(T ) = v(Z).
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Proof. If: It is left for the reader.
Only if: W.l.o.g. we can assume that T \ Z 6= ∅ (if T \ Z = ∅, then the
proof ends), and let T \ Z = {l1, . . . , lm} and Z \ T = {q1, . . . , qm}. Here,
T \Z ⊆ S and Z \ T ⊆ S, S is an equivalence set in v, hence for each player
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m:
v((T ∩ Z) ∪ {l1, . . . , li})
= v((T ∩ Z) ∪ {l1, . . . , li−1}) + v
′
li
((T ∩ Z) ∪ {l1, . . . , li−1})
= v((T ∩ Z) ∪ {q1, . . . , qi−1}) + v
′
qi
((T ∩ Z) ∪ {q1, . . . , qi−1})
= v((T ∩ Z) ∪ {q1, . . . , qi})
Therefore v(T ) = v(Z). 
Next, we consider a direct corollary of Lemma 3.7.
Corollary 3.8. Let v ∈ GN , S ⊆ N be an equivalence set in v, and k ∈ N\S.
Then for all T, Z ⊆ N such that T \S = Z \S and |T | = |Z|: v′k(T ) = v
′
k(Z).
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Let v ∈ GN be such that S ⊂ N is an equivalence
set in v, and k ∈ N \ S.
Let game w ∈ GN be defined as follows for each coalition T ⊆ N : if
T ∩ (S ∪ {k}) = ∅, then let w(T ) be arbitrarily defined such that w(∅) = 0.
In the other cases (T ∩ (S ∪ {k}) 6= ∅), let
w(T ) = w(T \ (S ∪ {k})) +
m∑
i=1
v′k((T \ (S ∪ {k})) ∪ {l1, . . . , li−1}) , (3)
where m = |(S ∪ {k}) ∩ T |, and li ∈ S ∩ T , i = 1, . . . , m− 1.
Notice that from Corollary 3.8
m∑
i=1
v′k((T \ (S ∪{k}))∪{l1, . . . , li−1}) does
not depend on the ordering of the elements of S∩T , that is, w is well-defined.
It is easy to verify that w′k = v
′
k. Furthermore, from Lemma 3.7 S ∪ {k}
is an equivalence set in w. 
Proof of Theorem 3.5. See Theorem 3.4 and Proposition 3.6. 
Next, we show that Young (1985)’s axiomatization is also valid on some
considered subclasses of games.
Theorem 3.9. Solution ψ defined on the class of either (strictly) convex,
(strictly) weakly superadditive, (strictly) monotone, additive, (strictly) weakly
subadditive or (strictly) concave games satisfies axioms PO, ETP and M , if
and only if ψ = φ, that is, if and only if it is the Shapley solution.
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Proof. We show that all considered subclasses of games are M-closed.
Let v ∈ GN be such that S ⊂ N is an equivalence set in v, and k ∈ N \S.
The proof of Lemma 3.6 shows that there exists w ∈ GN such that S ∪ {k}
is an equivalence set in w, w′k = v
′
k, and for each coalition T such that
T ∩ (S ∪ {k}) = ∅, T 6= ∅: w(T ) is arbitrarily defined. Therefore, the only
thing we have to do is to show that we can give values to these coalitions
such that w be in the considered class of games.
(I) The class of additive games: It is well known that game z ∈ GN is
additive, if and only if for each Player i ∈ N there exists ci ∈ R such that
for each coalition T ⊆ N \ {i}: z′i(T ) = ci.
Let c∗ = v′k(∅), and for for each T ⊆ N let
w(T ) = c∗|T | . (4)
Then, it is easy to see that w′k = v
′
k, w is additive and N is an equivalence
set in w.
(II) The classes of (strictly) convex, (strictly) weakly superadditive and
(strictly) monotone games: Let M > maxT⊂N |v
′
k(T )|, and for the coalitions
on which w is arbitrarily defined (T ∩ (S ∪{k}) = ∅, T 6= ∅, see Lemma 3.6):
let
w(T ) =M |N |(|T |+ 1)|T | . (5)
(A) Then it is easy to see that if v is a (strictly) weakly superadditive,
(strictly) monotone game, then so is w (for the other properties see Lemma
3.6).
(B) Next we show that, if v is a (strictly) convex game, then so is w. First
notice that game z ∈ GN is strictly convex, if and only if for each i ∈ N ,
T, Z ⊆ N \ {i} such that Z ⊂ T : z′i(Z) < z
′
i(T ) (see (1)).
Let l ∈ N \ (S ∪ {k}) and T, Z ⊆ N \ {l} be such that Z ⊂ T , then
w′l(T ) = w(T ∪ {l})− w(T )
= w((T ∪ {l}) \ (S ∪ {k})) +
m∑
i=1
w′li(((T ∪ {l}) \ (S ∪ {k})) ∪ {l1, . . . , li−1})
−w(T \ (S ∪ {k}))−
m∑
i=1
w′li((T \ (S ∪ {k})) ∪ {l1, . . . , li−1}) ,
and
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w′l(Z) = w(Z ∪ {l})− w(Z)
= w((Z ∪ {l}) \ (S ∪ {k})) +
n∑
i=1
w′li(((Z ∪ {l}) \ (S ∪ {k})) ∪ {l1, . . . , li−1})
−w(Z \ (S ∪ {k}))−
n∑
i=1
w′li((Z \ (S ∪ {k})) ∪ {l1, . . . , li−1}) ,
where m = |(S∪{k})∩T |, n = |(S∪{k})∩Z| and {l1, . . . , ln} = (S∪{k})∩
Z = (S∪{k})∩(Z∪{l}) ⊆ (S∪{k})∩(T ∪{l}) = (S∪{k})∩T = {l1, . . . , lm}.
Notice that, if T \ (S ∪ {k}) = Z \ (S ∪ {k}), then the proof is complete.
Therefore, w.l.o.g. we can assume that Z \ (S ∪ {k}) ⊂ T \ (S ∪ {k}). Game
v is a (strictly) convex game, S ∪ {k} is an equivalence set in w and n < |N |
so
m∑
i=1
w′li(((T ∪ {l}) \ (S ∪ {k})) ∪ {l1, . . . , li−1})
−
m∑
i=1
w′li((T \ (S ∪ {k})) ∪ {l1, . . . , li−1})
−
n∑
i=1
w′li(((Z ∪ {l}) \ (S ∪ {k})) ∪ {l1, . . . , li−1})
+
n∑
i=1
w′li((Z \ (S ∪ {k})) ∪ {l1, . . . , li−1}) > −2M |N | .
(6)
On the other hand, from (5)
w((T ∪ {l}) \ (S ∪ {k}))− w(T \ (S ∪ {k}))
−w((Z ∪ {l}) \ (S ∪ {k})) + w(Z \ (S ∪ {k}))
=M |N |
(
(|(T ∪ {l}) \ (S ∪ {k})|+ 1)|(T∪{l})\(S∪{k})|
− (|T \ (S ∪ {k})|+ 1)|T\(S∪{k})|
− (|(Z ∪ {l}) \ (S ∪ {k})|+ 1)|(Z∪{l})\(S∪{k})|
+ (|Z \ (S ∪ {k})|+ 1)|Z\(S∪{k})|
)
> 2M |N | .
(7)
Summing up (6) and (7)
w′l(T )− w
′
l(Z) > 0 . (8)
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Since l ∈ N \ (S ∪ {k}) and T, Z ⊆ N \ {l}, Z ⊂ T were arbitrarily chosen,
w is (strictly) convex (for the other properties see Lemma 3.6).
(III) The class of (strictly) concave and (strictly) subadditive games.
(A) Notice that a game v is (strictly), if and only if v¯ is (strictly) convex
(see (2)). Therefore, see Remark 3.3, from Point (II) the class of (strictly)
concave games is an M-closed class of games.
(B) The class of (strictly) weakly subadditive games: It is worth noticing
that the dual of a (strictly) subadditive or a (strictly) weakly subadditive
game is not necessarily (strictly) superadditive or (strictly) weakly superad-
ditive respectively, e.g. v = (4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 7) is strictly subadditive, but v¯ is
not weakly superadditive. Moreover, the dual of a (strictly) superadditive
or a (strictly) weakly superadditive game is not necessarily (strictly) subad-
ditive or (strictly) weakly subadditive, e.g. v = (0, 0, 0, 3, 1, 2, 4) is strictly
superadditive, but v¯ is not weakly subadditive.
Let M = v′k(∅), and for the coalitions on which w is arbitrarily defined
(T ∩ (S ∪ {k}) = ∅, T 6= ∅, see Lemma 3.6): let
w(T ) =M |T |2 . (9)
Then it is easy to see that, if v is a (strictly) weakly subadditive game,
then so is w (for the other properties see Lemma 3.6).
Finally we can apply Theorem 3.4. 
Notice that not all the classes of games (defined in the Preliminaries) are
M-closed, the classes of essential, (strictly) superadditive, (strictly) subad-
ditive games are not M-closed. The next example shows this fact.
Example 3.10. (1) Let v = (0, 0, 10, 50, 0, 0, 20), where S = {1, 2} is an equiv-
alence set in v. Game v is essential. However, the only game w such that
N is an equivalence set in w, and w′3 = v
′
3 is w = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10,−20),
but w is not essential.
(2) Let v = (0, 0, 0, 10, 51, 51, 51, 51, 51, 51, 62, 62, 62, 62, 103), where S
= {1, 2, 3} is an equivalence set in v. Game v is strictly superadditive.
However, the only game w such that N is an equivalence set in w, and
w′4 = v
′
4, is w = (10, 10, 10, 10, 61, 61, 61, 61, 61, 61, 72, 72, 72, 72, 113), but w
is not superadditive. For the subadditive case take −v.
Remark 3.11. If |N | ≤ 3, then the classes of (strictly) superadditive, (strictly)
subadditive games coincide with the classes of (strictly) weakly superadditive,
(strictly) weakly subadditive games respectively, hence they are M-closed.
Furthermore, if |N | = 2, then the class of essential games coincides with the
class of strictly superadditive games, hence it is M-closed.
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Although the above mentioned classes of games are not M-closed, so
Theorem 3.4 cannot be applied to them, Young (1985)’s axiomatization works
for them (see p. 71 in Young (1985)).
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